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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we examine the possibility of interspecies political 
agency at the level of social movements. We ask to what extent ani-
mals and humans can be co-participants in one another’s liberation 
from oppression. To do so, we assess arguments for and against in-
cluding animals in the ‘total liberation package,’ taken as the libera-
tion from oppressive societal structures. These are not pragmatic-
political arguments, but conceptual-philosophical arguments that 
have been put before animal liberationists attempting to ‘piggy-back’ 
on human liberation movements. In discrediting these philosophical 
arguments, we argue that animals have capacities for self-liberation 
that humans can facilitate and that animals, in turn, can facilitate 
human liberation.   As such, we defend the coherence of a total lib-
eration package linking all oppression and all liberation, animal and 
human. We further argue that the rhetoric of total animal/human lib-
eration performs a vital function in creating unity and solidarity be-
tween otherwise disparate and fragmented social justice movements. 
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Introduction
Since the early 2000s, the concept of total liberation (Best 
2014, Pellow 2014) has emerged as the theoretical foundation 
for radical earth and animal liberation movements.  This pos-
its the conceptual linkage or interconnection of all oppressions 
and all liberations.  In this respect, it makes a claim that is not 
merely historical and sociological: that diverse forms of oppres-
sion have similar historical origins and depend on a particular 
“logic of domination” (Kalof et al. 2004, p. 239).  Instead, it 
claims an inherent interconnectedness (Cochrane 2016, Noske 
1997) of all oppressions and liberations such that each logically 
intersects with the others to form a totality (Krinsky 2013). In-
deed, this notion of logical interconnectedness serves strategic 
purposes for radical earth and animal liberation movements 
who unite under a shared semantic or a ‘constitutive master 
frame’ for injustices (Mooney & Hunt 1996).
 Such a “shared language of connection” (Barker et al. 2013, 
p. 29) may unite diverse movements today.  Nevertheless, the 
alliance sometimes obscures disparities between separated 
streams of activists based on their degree of radicalism, mo-
dus operandi or particular cause (cf.Mertes 2004, on the in-
trapolitics of social movements). This fragmentation of social 
movements, all advocating for total liberation, frequently re-
sults from an effort by other actors – particularly the state – to 
atomize movements and sever linkages in order to contain or 
neutralize them (Galtung 1990).  However, advocates of those 
progressive social movements with which it seeks alliances 
sometimes also criticize the total liberation frame for being ex-
cessively broad.  They criticize it for ignoring significant con-
ceptual and moral differences between the cases of oppression 
it seeks to link.  Linkages represent desperate attempts to “…
piggy-back on other social justice causes” (Brisman 2010).  In-
Michael P. Allen and Erica von Essen
177
http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/ Vol. 23, Issue 1
deed, some animal rights activists criticize the total liberation 
frame for fundamentally misusing the language of liberation 
as applicable only to normal adult humans (Cochrane 2009). 
These criticisms result in the continued fragmentation of ani-
mal and human liberation movements and the reproduction of 
an animal/human divide. At best, critics declare such inclusive 
movements attempt to “do too much,” bewildering the land-
scape of justice (Choudry & Shragge 2011).
In this paper, we examine but reject the more cutting con-
ceptual criticisms directed toward the total animal/human 
liberation package by diverse social justice and animal rights 
advocates from across the political spectrum.  Indeed, we com-
bine animal and human liberation in a conceptually coherent 
package.  Its coherence is grounded, in part, in animal stud-
ies arguing for moral equivalency across human and animal 
injustices (Pellow 2014) as well as in the under-acknowledged 
agency of animals in protesting, breaking free, or even liberat-
ing other animals (Hribal 2013).  Nevertheless, we argue that 
it is also grounded in the political literature’s stretching of the 
boundaries around what constitutes an act of resistance/libera-
tion (Hollander & Einwohner 2004), thus inviting examples of 
animal liberations in which humans and non-human animals 
are both active co-participants and animals are co-dependents: 
in interdependent liberation agency.  All of this leads us to de-
clare that partitioning the total liberation package into irrecon-
cilable or morally non-equivalent compartmentalized struggles 
across different species is an unhelpful and incorrect discrimi-
nation to perpetrate today (cf. Hadley 2017). We write our es-
say in the intersections of social movement studies, human-
animal studies and political theory, aiming to contribute to new 
ways of conceptualizing the rising field of radical animal rights 
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activism and direct-action animal abolitionists, as well as its 
potential alliances on the social movement landscape. 
Our essay is an entry to the growing field of political animal 
studies, spurred by a ‘political turn’ in animal rights (Kymlicka 
2017). We focus on the question of animal rather than earth 
liberation for practical reasons.  We assume that the conceptual 
problems with incorporating non-human animals into a total 
liberation package will also extend to incorporating plants and 
ecosystems into such a package, given these ostensibly all lack 
agency comparable to humans. However, we do not make that 
argument here.  Instead, we are concerned specifically with 
evaluating the purported conceptual linkages or interconnec-
tions between the oppression and liberation of non-human and 
human animals. These are, after all, united in the common ex-
perience of sentience and are different only in degree and not 
kind (Petulla 1989).
We proceed as follows. First, we sketch the program for total 
liberation as it has emerged from the radical earth and animal 
liberation movements. Second, we narrow our focus on animal 
liberation in the context of the total liberation package, laying 
out and evaluating arguments against the conceptual interrelat-
edness of animal and human liberation. Third, we reevaluate 
the concept of total liberation in light of these criticisms.
What is Total Liberation? 
The Earth Liberation Front first stated the total liberation 
concept in 2001 as follows:
We want to be clear that all oppression is linked, just 
as we are all linked, and we believe in a diversity 
of tactics to stop earth rape and end all domination.  
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Together we can destroy this patriarchal nightmare, 
which is currently in the form of techno-industrial 
global capitalism.
Responding to this statement, Pellow (2014) proposes that 
total liberation comprises four pillars:
1. ethics of justice and anti-oppression inclusive of 
humans, nonhuman animals, and ecosystems;
2. anarchism;
3. anti-capitalism;
4. embrace of direct-action tactic (p. 4).
Here, we take it that 1) it is a neutral restatement concerning 
the linkage of all oppressions.  By itself, this need not entail 
commitments to 2) - 4). After all, ‘an ethic of justice and anti-
oppression inclusive of humans and nonhumans could, in prin-
ciple, be embraced by those who accept the legitimate author-
ity of the state and who deny capitalism is necessarily opposed 
to the demands of morality and justice. Nevertheless, Pellow 
specifically ties total liberation to anarchism and anti-capital-
ism. Best (2014) does the same. Both explain this tie to anar-
chism and anti-capitalism in light of the frustration of radical 
earth and animal activists with “the elitism, racism, and tacti-
cal reformism of mainstream animal rights and environmental 
movements” (Pellow 2014, p. 4). Indeed, to them, mainstream 
ecological and animal rights movements, like Greenpeace, 
“lack awareness of and commitment to anti-oppression poli-
tics” and embrace “state-centric and market oriented solutions” 
(Ibid), leading to their co-optation by the system and the ero-
sion of their integrity (Johansen & Martin 2008).  
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To radical animal liberationists, these insider tactics are in-
sufficient to address the present ecological crisis or respond 
to the gross injustices and exploitation suffered by non-human 
animals. On this view, there are no effective market-oriented 
solutions. Markets are structured by the hierarchical state 
dominated by the profit-motives of powerful corporate elites. 
Indeed, a common theme in the total liberation literature is 
that representative democracy is a myth (Best 2014) and that 
the state and markets are ultimately unresponsive to alternative 
ideas and values.  At most, market solutions pay lip service 
to ecological ideas and values, while continuing with business 
as usual. Consequently, deep skepticism about the state and 
markets motivates tying total liberation to anarchism and anti-
capitalism.  
What, however, about anti-capitalism and the aspiration of 
total liberationists to ‘destroy the patriarchal nightmare’ that 
is capitalism? Total liberation is influenced deeply by eco-
feminist thought and the central role it assigns to patriarchy 
in explaining diverse oppressions. According to eco-feminism, 
patriarchy is the core not only of women’s oppression but also 
of animals and general nature (Adams 1993). (Gruen 2007) ar-
ticulates the concept of total liberation from an eco-feminist 
perspective when she writes:
Women, people of color, queers, non-human animals are 
all thought to be lower in the hierarchy than white, heterosex-
ual, able-bodied men. The conceptual tools and institutional 
structures that maintain the status of these men are employed 
against women and animals.  Oppression of any of these groups 
is thus linked, and if one is opposed to sexism, racism, and 
heterosexism, etc. she should also oppose speciesism (p. 336). 
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Here, the primary conceptual tool of patriarchy in “post-Me-
dieval Western male psychology” (Donovan 2007, p. 65) is the 
idea that reason can and indeed should dominate nature. Closer 
to nature, women -- like non-human animals -- should thus be 
the objects of domination by men.  However, the preeminent 
expression of this patriarchal male psychology of domination 
through reason is the efficient capitalist exploitation of the 
earth’s resources, including those trillions of animals harvest-
ed for human consumption each year in factory farms that are 
effectively an Eternal Treblinka for animals (Patterson 2002). 
As the ultimate expression of patriarchal domination, the in-
stitutional structures of capitalism, such as factory farms that 
answer only to the profit motive of elite corporations, must be 
destroyed rather than reformed. 
It is often argued, following Galtung (1990), that animals 
must be liberated from such conditions because they ultimately 
experience violence in the same dimensions and by many of 
the same mechanisms of injustice as humans: direct, structural 
and cultural. These denote immediate harm to their physical 
well-being, such as slaughter, hunting and abuse; structural 
harms from displacement or loss of habitat following indus-
trial development or climate change; and cultural harm on the 
level of societal discourses blinding us to the violence we in-
flict upon animals. In an example of the latter, capitalism and 
a commodity logic condition us on a level of language to think 
of pigs as ‘pork,’ calf as ‘veal,’ chicken as ‘poultry,’ and more 
(Adams 1993). Even if not all animals can approximate the full 
range of suffering from such harm as humans (a pig does not 
suffer psychologically if it is termed pork), they manifestly ex-
perience the effects of violence that such schemes enable. This 
leads scholars to declare that human and animal predicaments 
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under capitalism are comparable in terms of harm and that lib-
eration for both is required.
What about Pellow’s fourth pillar, direct action?  Why 
should total liberation be tied to this as opposed, say, to civil 
disobedience or armed rebellion against the state and the capi-
talist mode of production?  Earth and animal liberationists are 
willing to engage in direct acts of trespass, theft, sabotage, and 
confrontation or intimidation, but they repudiate physical vio-
lence against persons (Pellow 2014).  Unlike nonviolent civil 
disobedience, they do not affirm the legitimacy of the state 
principle of the rule of law (Rawls 1971). Unlike armed rebels, 
they do not seek the replacement of one form of the state with 
another. To this extent, their goal is to create a better world, 
but not through reforming or replacing the state.  They take 
direct action to do the right thing when the state fails to deliver 
justice. 
This explains the strikingly negative orientation of the origi-
nal 2001 statement of the total liberation project.  Rather than 
offering a future utopian blueprint (Pellow 2014; Best 2014), 
total liberation is, above all, a commitment to physically ‘stop-
ping’ injustice and to doing so now through direct action, when 
necessary. Indeed, we shall return to this point in the third sec-
tion of this paper, discussing an alternative positive orientation 
to total liberation. Having laid out the total liberation program, 
we turn next to criticisms of its logical coherence focusing spe-
cifically on the inclusion of animal liberation in the total libera-
tion package.   
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Arguments against including Animals in a Total 
Liberation Package
Not all arguments against including animal liberation in 
the total liberation package are concerned with the question of 
logical or conceptual coherence. Indeed, some arguments are 
pragmatic.  For example, time and resources devoted to animal 
liberation come at the expense of time and resources devoted to 
human liberation – say, the struggles against racism or sexism. 
Likewise, championing the cause of animal liberation will di-
minish the currency of justice, eroding the seriousness with 
which human injustices are treated (Arluke 2002). There is also 
a substantial body of scholarship and movement observations 
that critique the relatively privileged socioeconomic status of 
many animal rights activists—who are overwhelmingly white 
middle-class—as compared to human liberationists who come 
from diverse backgrounds (Emel & Wolch 1998, Guither 1998). 
That said, however, we address not empirical but rather con-
ceptual arguments concerning the coherence of including ani-
mals in a total liberation package from the perspective of both 
the non-anarchist left and mainstream and bourgeois political 
thought.  We divide our discussion into three categories. These 
concern (1) the status of animal liberation with a project of op-
posing the systemic interconnectedness of oppression; (2) the 
purported absence of logical connections between the oppres-
sion of animals and of humans based on morally significant 
species differences; and (3) the purported absence of logical 
connections between animals having rights and their being the 
subjects, as opposed to objects, of liberation.  
We begin then with a basic criticism of radical animal lib-
erationist from the non-anarchist left, challenging its status as 
a component of any total, anti-systemic liberation campaign. 
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Indeed, we distinguish between the ‘non-anarchist’ left com-
mitted to system-replacement in 1) and 2) and mainstream 
or bourgeois theorists committed to system reform in 3).  As 
anarchists, radical animal liberationists oppose both the non-
anarchist left and the bourgeois mainstream. 
Animal Liberation is not an Anti-systemic Movement
Given its emphasis on the interconnectedness of all oppres-
sion, total liberation might seem to be an anti-systemic move-
ment in Wallerstein (2002)’s sense. That is, rather than a single-
issue movement, it seems to address the interconnected system 
of oppression and exploitation: race, ethnicity, sex, gender, 
class, age, and species. However, critics of the animal libera-
tion movement’s claim to solidarity with human liberation sug-
gest that this is misleading.  Appearances to the contrary, they 
posit that animal liberation is not part of an anti-systemic or 
total liberation movement, but instead remains a single-issue 
movement.  
Indeed, according to Fotopoulos and Sargis (2006), animal 
liberationists resorting to direct action target “crucial political 
and economic institutions of the system” (2006, p.1).  Neverthe-
less, that “does not by itself render this single-issue movement 
into an anti-systemic one” (Ibid).  Indeed, animal liberation is 
not anti-systemic unless it aims to become an organic part of 
“a universal project to replace the present system” (Ibid; our 
italics), in light of some utopian blueprint.  As we have seen, 
however, earth and animal liberationists claiming to function 
as part of a total liberation movement do not have this aim or 
aspiration; they rather disrupt daily practices. Indeed, animal 
liberation is described as a “stop-gap measure” (Liszt 1990, p. 
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164) or as “cessation” (Magel 1988, p.205). Consequently, they 
are not genuinely anti-systemic, total liberationists.  
What should we make of this argument?  One might object 
that it works only by definitional fiat.  If total, anti-system lib-
eration entails replacing the present system, then animal lib-
erationists who subscribe the Pellow’s four pillars cannot also 
be total liberationists.  Nevertheless, it appears arbitrary to in-
sist that total liberation must entail replacing the system rather 
than acting independently of it or sometimes with or through it. 
The anarchist pillar expresses deep skepticism about any state-
managed system – capitalist or socialist – delivering justice. 
Given this anti-statist assumption, the best hope for delivering 
justice to the victims of interlinked oppression does not lie in 
replacing one state system with another.  Consequently, those 
subscribing to the four pillars might insist they are genuinely 
anti-systemic because they do not merely oppose the present 
system, but rather all state-managed systems.  
Absence of any Logical Connection between Animal and 
Human Liberation
The second line of argumentation against including animals 
in a total liberation package questions the coherence of treating 
animal and human liberation as morally equivalent. Indeed, 
animal liberation is motivated primarily through the idea that 
our present treatment of animals is based on speciesism. As 
for discrimination in favor of the human species over all other 
species, speciesism is equivalent to racism as discrimination in 
favor of one’s race over other races or sexism as discrimination 
in favor of one’s gender over the other, and so on (Horta 2010). 
Discrimination based on race, sex, and species thus results in 
linked oppressions insofar as they entail an equivalent moral 
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error.  This, of course, presupposes that discrimination violates 
some principle of moral equivalency applicable to the total-
ity of linked oppressions.  In this respect, animal liberation-
ists typically appeal to a principle of equal consideration based 
on sentience or selfhood.  Hence, different races, sexes, and 
different species are all entitled to equal consideration due to 
their equal capacities for suffering or self-consciousness (Plu-
har 1988).  Nevertheless, many leftist and mainstream theorists 
contest this claim to equal consideration.  
In both cases, an appeal is made to the higher-level cognitive 
capacities of humans as a morally relevant difference.  Above 
the level of sentience and self-consciousness, these are capa-
bilities for linguistic communication, abstract reasoning, long-
term planning, and entering into moral agreements (Scruton 
2000). Indeed, these are all capabilities for political agency or 
active political participation. In other words, they are prereq-
uisites for participation in a liberation struggle. Leftist critics 
of animal liberation assign considerable importance to distinc-
tively human capabilities for political agency. From a leftist 
perspective, liberation struggles are crucial undertakings by 
the oppressed to liberate themselves (Fotopoulos & Sargis 
2006, Staudenmaier 2003). This is not to say that dissident 
members of an oppressor class or race do not also play a role in 
liberating the oppressed (Vanderheiden 2005).  Nevertheless, 
the latter should not attempt to co-opt or direct the movement, 
but rather defer to the actual subjects of oppression as political 
agents in their own right. That, however, is impossible in the 
case of animal liberation, who cannot lead such movements 
autonomously. 
On this argument, animals are never the “subjects” of a 
liberation movement: instead, “they can only be its objects” 
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(Fotopoulos and Sargis 2006, p. 4). Here, the rank impossibil-
ity of animals becoming political agents and subjects of their 
own liberation undermines the moral equivalency of specie-
sism with racism and sexism. Racist and sexist societies are 
examples of heteronomous societies denying the autonomy of 
humans based on race and sex. Indeed, to the extent that all 
humans possess capabilities for autonomy and political agency 
regardless of race and sex, these are heteronomous societies 
that could be autonomous or liberated societies. However, the 
same cannot be said about a purportedly ‘speciesist’ society. 
Animals necessarily remain heteronomous in their relations to 
us: these are not heteronomous relations that could be autono-
mous. Consequently, speciesism is not morally equivalent to 
racism and sexism.  The political order of society is necessarily 
anthropocentric, but that does not mean animals are therefore 
the subject of an arbitrary bias or prejudice on the part of hu-
mans. This is not to deny that there are “legitimate reasons 
to abstain from eating meat or to oppose cruelty to animals” 
(Staudenmaier 2003). It is to assert the “incommensurability” 
of animal and human liberation paradigms (Ibid; Fotopou-
los and Sargis 2006).  Based on considerations of autonomy 
and political agency, the defense of anthropocentrism is also 
stressed by mainstream or bourgeois critics of animal libera-
tion: while they are certainly owed kindness and even certain 
rights, horses cannot vote (Evans 2005, Fjellstrom 2002, Scru-
ton 2000).
Nevertheless, these arguments do not explicitly deny that 
animals could be liberated.  At most, they establish that there 
is no conceptual interdependency between animal and human 
liberation at the level of political agency.  Even if they are not 
subjects of their own liberation as autonomous political agents, 
animals might still be liberated by humans from cruel treat-
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ment at the hands of other humans.  In this respect, “the libera-
tion of humans is a precondition for the liberation of animals,” 
but “not vice versa” (Fotopoulos and Sargis 2006, pp. 2-3; 
their emphasis).  Nevertheless, the oppression and liberation 
of animals remain linked to human liberation, albeit through 
a relation of dependency rather than equality. This does not 
undermine the concept of total liberation from all oppressions 
as much as cause us to reconceive the links between animal 
and human liberation in terms of priority and dependency rela-
tions. This line of argument is also not unique to animals; Liszt 
(1990) makes the important point that liberation is a response 
to structural violence and that objects of structural violence – 
be they human or non-human – “can be persuaded to notice 
nothing at all” as part of this violence (p. 164). This implies that 
victims of oppression do not need to internalize their injustice, 
as someone may recognize it on their behalf, which is demon-
strably the case with animal liberation.
Animal Rights and Liberation can be De-coupled 
The third and final argument against including animals in 
the total liberation package comes from an influential argu-
ment from Cochrane (2009). This is not an argument from the 
non-anarchist left concerned with the priority of human over 
animal liberation, but rather mainstream bourgeois ethics con-
cerned primarily with the value of autonomy for individual 
human persons.  While he does not specifically address the 
total liberation program, Cochrane’s argument is potentially 
devastating because it purports to refute the intelligibility of 
‘liberating’ non-autonomous animals.  They obviously cannot 
be incorporated into a package of total liberation if they can-
not be liberated.  Cochrane’s argument proceeds by denying 
that rights-holders must have any complex cognitive capacities 
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for moral and rational agency.  To this extent, he effectively 
de-couples having a right from individual autonomy.  He then 
argues non-autonomous rights-holders -- including most (if not 
all) animals -- have no intrinsic interest in liberty and, as such, 
any movement or struggle for their liberation.  Indeed, the 
concept of liberation applies only to autonomous agents with 
higher-order capacities for rationality.  
Hence, it is intelligible to say that a human slave can be lib-
erated from the condition of slavery because she can be lib-
erated to exercise her capabilities of autonomy free from the 
arbitrary interference of a master.  However, it is unintelligible 
to talk about liberating non-autonomous domesticated animals. 
Whether they realize it or not (Feinberg 1974) such animals 
have interests in remaining under the care of human owners 
as long as they are treated humanely.  Such dependency rela-
tions under the care of humans are a distinct improvement over 
the suffering they would otherwise experience if they were 
returned to the wild and exposed to hostile nature (Cochrane 
2009, Giroux 2016). In sum, according to Cochrane, animals 
have rights to humane treatment, but this has nothing to do 
with liberating them to live lives that they choose freely just 
like emancipated slaves or emancipated women.  On the con-
trary, liberty and liberation are of no interest to non-autono-
mous animals as opposed to autonomous humans.    
Animal and Human Liberation Realigned
We argue now for three interrelated claims: (1) that animals 
are agents in their own liberation; (2) that autonomy over-de-
termines the concept of liberation such that it is meaningful 
to talk about liberation without autonomy; (3) that animal lib-
eration is consistent with non-paternalistic relations of depen-
dency on humans to help or assist in an inter-species liberation 
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struggle.  If we are successful, then we will have made signifi-
cant progress towards a coherent total animal and human total 
liberation package.  
Regarding (1), we stress some animal rights scholars have 
argued that animals can be active agents in their own libera-
tion, given they display preferences for freedom through exit 
signals like ‘voting with their feet’ (Hribal 2013, Meijer 2013, 
Warren 2011). Indeed, they contend that construing resistance 
in terms of a human-led political liberation misses the species-
specific styles of communication that animals use to assert 
protest (Driessen 2014). This is noted by scholars studying plu-
ral expressions of human protest, direct action, and liberation 
forms. They argue there is a need to consider the full array 
of ‘voice’ employed by individuals, especially those with few 
political resources, of which animals seem a prime example 
(Tsai 2012). In this view, voice may be non-verbal and non-
linguistic. It is enough, for example, that one’s direct action lib-
eration speaks for itself, insofar as it emits a “silent signal that 
exit generates” (Warren 2011, p. 693) and that escape is very 
much a key strategy of resistance that has political meaning 
(Hardt 1992). Insofar as some concede liberty may be less im-
portant to animals than to humans, they note this cannot be an 
across-the-board assertion; it is true that to a dog, a condition 
of benevolent domination may be preferable to release, but for 
wild animals autonomy, liberty and sovereignty appear criti-
cal to their species flourishing (Donaldson & Kymlicka 2011, 
Palmer 2010).
Further, regarding intentionality, some scholars include ani-
mal liberation within the remit of ‘accidental resistance’ (cf. 
Kumar 2013 for this concept in the human context, Lilja et al. 
2013). They argue that one primary determinant of an action’s 
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political content is, in fact, the societal and political reception 
it receives from authorities, media or wider publics (Tafon & 
Saunders 2015). This means that the instigator is not usually the 
one who has the power to designate their action as a political/
anarchist act of liberation; this occurs also through retrospec-
tive resolving of events (Hájek et al. 2014). They note that it is 
virtually impossible to access the presemiotic intent of resist-
ers, thus calling for the necessary co-construction of a political 
meaning for the act (Vinthagen & Johansson 2013). While this 
should not open up an ‘everything can be resistance’ perspec-
tive, it does cast doubt on the Rawlsian prerequisite of rational 
autonomous political agency necessarily preceding the act. For 
animals, the implications are clear. They scarcely intend their 
exits and self-liberation to be political statements. They are not 
the consequences of ‘moral commitment’ (Kumar 2013). But 
research shows diverse animals, from apes to octopi, express 
clearly preferences for freedom, planning escape attempts, and 
even attempts to break out other animals in the enclosure. 
Hence, regarding (2), we contend it is sufficient to say that 
acts of accidental or non-political resistance are properly self-
liberation acts.  To be sure, they are not preferences for auton-
omy equivalent to the preferences of oppressed slaves or wom-
en.  Nevertheless, that is beside the point.  As preferences for 
freedom, animals express desires for their own freedom from 
conditions they experience as unwanted and constraining; con-
ditions from which they are agents of their liberation.  To this 
extent, we see no compelling reason to restrict the language of 
liberation to actions intended as political statements and based 
on moral commitments.  We see that as an arbitrary over-de-
termination of what it means for an agent to free herself from 
a given set of unwanted conditions or circumstances.  Indeed, 
Cochrane (2009) over-determines the concept of liberation by 
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arbitrarily insisting that the agent or instigator of her own lib-
eration must also be the societal designator of her action as a 
liberation action.  
Still, actions alone may be insufficient to link them to the 
political movement of animal liberation, which entails goals 
that are considerably more abstract. Regarding (3), then, we 
suggest this is where humans’ role in animal liberation ap-
pears. Not only do animal activists participate physically in 
the releases of animals, but they also give meaning to these 
acts. While often eager to escape, most animals could prob-
ably rarely orchestrate their escape attempts alone and thus rely 
on human-dependent agency. Equally, however, the liberation 
act would not be complete without the animals; human agency 
alone is not enough.  Consequently, we argue that the action is 
a function of dependent or interdependent agency: animals and 
humans depend on each other for the action to be realized as a 
liberation. Dependent agency now represents a recurring and 
instructive line of argument within animal studies that opens 
up for new ways to understand animals’ expressions, autonomy 
and interests (Meijer 2013). Here, human assistance is non-pa-
ternalistic to the extent that humans take their ‘cue’ from the 
animals.  
Is such assistance consistent with the idea of interlocking 
oppressions and liberations crossing the species divide?  We 
say it affects considerable progress in that direction: animal 
and human agency intertwine in a liberation act.  Nevertheless, 
it might still be objected that we have only shown it meaningful 
and coherent to say that humans are participants in animal lib-
eration, despite species differences in capabilities for autono-
my.  We have not shown that animals are participants in the lib-
eration of humans.  However, this is not an absurd proposition. 
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Psychological research shows that “reducing the status divide 
between animals and humans” can help “reduce prejudice and 
strengthen belief in equality between human groups” (Kymlic-
ka & Donaldson 2014, p. 120). Indeed, through our interactions 
with them  (Wright 2017) animals can potentially help humans 
liberate themselves from their racism, sexism, homophobia, 
and so on.  In other words, humans may depend on the agen-
cy of non-autonomous animals for their spiritual liberation as 
much as animals depend on autonomous humans – albeit for 
different sorts of liberations. This much seems  particularly 
salient in modernity, where nature reconciliation and recon-
necting with animals is increasingly championed as a cure for 
the ‘disease’ of modern society and the systemic shackles of 
oppression that many believe characterizes our industrial soci-
ety (Swan 1995).    
Conclusions
Our paper reviewed the philosophical arguments sounded 
by critics for keeping separate animal liberation and human 
liberation on grounds that they are morally non-equivalent and 
that it is incoherent to see them as fundamentally interrelated. 
We then engaged in arguments for keeping them together, ex-
amining the capacities of non-autonomous animals for self-
liberation and reassessing the meaning of the term liberation 
without the over-determined requirement of autonomy. Ulti-
mately, we found philosophical support for linking these two 
movements as champions of the total liberation concept. 
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